1: Fedotov S-4 (no date) 1954 RF1 Great Russia RF1

has its own key to Christianity, or at least its own nuances of it. There is no need, however, to distinguish between fine shades of Christianity in the Russian soul; all the contradictions stand out with stark boldness. Just try to express in one formula the religiosity of St. Sergius and the Archpriest Avvakum, that of the Metropolitan Philaret and of Dostoevsky. For good measure, add to these Greek-Orthodox folklore and the religion of Tolstoy!

The opinion is widely held that the Russian people are set apart from other European peoples by the peculiar intensity of their religiosity. Actually this impression derives from the fact that the twentieth century finds Russia and the rest of Europe in different acts of the religious-historical drama. In Russia, among the great mass of the people, the Middle Ages lived on right down to the middle of the nineteenth century. The Europe of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries would offer a closer analogy to imperial Russia. But the collapse of Russian medievalism was stormy and destructive in the extreme. Today the attitude towards religion, both on the part of the masses and of the intelligentsia, is not markedly different from that in other European countries.

. . . And now let us turn to our basic problem: which historical layers of the Russian soul have been destroyed by the Revolution and which will survive it? The answer now should be clear. The extermination of the old educated class and the suppression of all the sources that fed it were bound to remove the two uppermost strata from the spiritual structure of Russian society. The man of Empire and the intellectual perished together with the "bourgeoisie," the upper layer of the old society. As to the imperial type, the Russian of universal culture, some relics of it still survive within the ranks of the "specialists." Some time ago, the [Soviet] government belatedly realized that the liquidation of the upper cultural stratum was doing irreparable harm to technical progress. The surviving old-timers became the object of special attention. However, they were valued only in their capacity of specialists in some narrow field; as has been wittily said, golden watches were used to drive in nails. Their broad culture, no longer needed by anyone and even offensive to the new ruling class, still subsists within some tiny groups or even families. The new educated class produces exclusively specialists who often lack the rudiments of a general culture, even plain literacy. On the other hand, never since the Muscovite tsardom has Russia been fenced off from Europe by such a high wall. This wall has been erected not only by censorship and

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178 181 517 the ban on foreign travel, but also by inordinate conceit and outright contempt for decaying bourgeois Europe. Here lies the essential difference between the semi-literate technical intelligentsia of Tsar Peter and a similar intelligentsia under Stalin. That of Stalin has deliberately turned its back on Europe and in so doing has cut short the line of the "universal" Russian.

More complex was the fate of the intelligentsia proper. By the time the revolution broke out, this extraordinary formation had already lost its former vitality. After 1905 the intelligentsia began to dissolve, losing its identity within the whole of the "cultured" class. It was unable to survive the collapse of its political mysticism, desecrated by the pathetic Russian constitutionalism; the new brilliant religious-philosophical culture of the Russian renaissance of the twentieth century demoralized it with its many seductions; the war drew it into the stream of a national consciousness new to it. By 1917 the revolutionary enthusiasm of the intelligentsia was already a warmed-up dish. Its roots did not go deep, and the size of this social group, the only one to give loyal support to the Provisional Government, had shrunk considerably. The October Revolution hit it with all its weight. Dedicated to principles and uncompromising, the intelligentsia was utterly unable to acquiesce in the triumph of brute force. No wonder that the struggle against the new rulers bled it white. The few who survived either went into exile or filled Soviet prisons and concentration camps. Some managed to adjust themselves to the conditions of Soviet bureaucracy and turned into "specialists," gradually losing the last features of their noble "order." The mills of a brutal way of life were grinding without mercy. In the words of a Russian proverb—"to live with wolves one has to howl with them." Those unable to adjust themselves were cast out of the new life. The new intelligentsia now emerging is organically devoted to the Soviet régime; it feels a blood kinship with both the people and the ruling class. And for this reason it can never—not even in opposition, not even (let us anticipate the future) engaged in a revolutionary struggle against those in power—degenerate into that rootlessly-ideological, extremist, and eschatological type, let alone the dedicated fraternity we call the Russian intelligentsia.

However, this defunct Russian type is not entirely without successors. Sectarianism and spiritual journeying have not died out in the people, as insistently testified by the "godless" press. The Revolution has even given rise to some new sectarian formations,

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usually of an eschatological nature. On the other hand, part of the old intelligentsia have found a spiritual foothold in the Church. Here the last remnants of the vanished "order" can quench their spiritual thirst from the same spring that, unknown to them, had generated it. Within the Church they have, of course, preserved their psychological characteristics: their restlessness and extremism, their thirst for an integrated, consecrated life. Here they find themselves on common ground with the searchers and pilgrims of the people. One should keep in mind that the spiritual barrier between Church and dissenters is no longer what it was before the Revolution. Persecution has brought the various creeds closer together. The remnants of the old intelligentsia act as a ferment upon the whole religious mass. So far, however, this force has either been completely eliminated from all constructive cultural work or else has voluntarily turned away from it. Insofar as Russian culture of the immediate future is concerned, the old type of intellectual is definitely extinct.

What remains is the Muscovite with his vague ancestral heritage. The masses of the people who, molded by Soviet schools, produce the new human being, until quite recently lived and thought after the Muscovite pattern. The most radical ideological upheaval is powerless wholly to remake a spiritual mold. In the internationalist, the Marxist of today, whoever he may be, it is easy to recognize the village lad, the factory worker, as we remember them from the turn of the century. Paradoxical as it may sound, *homo Europaeo-Americanus* seems closer to Muscovy than to the more recent Petersburg era. The paradox is easily explained. *Homo Europaeo-Americanus* has little claim on the rich heritage of Europe's culture. He emerged in Europe in the period of her barbarization and assimilated a civilization already narrowed down to its athletic, technical, military contents. The savage of our time, technician or athlete, is the product of the disintegration of ancient culture going hand in hand with the absorption of barbarians into the civilized world. The Muscovite who, biding his time in rural Russia, outlasted two centuries of imperial culture, does not need any great effort to keep step with a Europe that has come to curse the last two centuries of her history. What might seem really amazing is the ease with which religion has been repudiated. But this is a special, highly complex theme. As to everything else, the Muscovite lout only had to be shaken up and kicked around for a while, to be jolted out of his indolence and sluggishness. What the tsarist barracks once did to

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leaders of an organized opposition to the Czarist autocracy were recruited.

By the nineteenth century, this landed gentry opposition to the Czarist regime took two main forms. One was pro-Western, seeking the reconstruction of the Czardom along humanistic, libertarian and juridical lines, brought about by the ideas of Humanism and Renaissance, by the Reformation and by the French and American Revolutions. The other was anti-Western, reacting against Western rationalism and materialism, against Western "heathenism" and cosmopolitanism, and against the Western system of impersonal formalism and open class strife which was beginning to infiltrate Russia.

In an attempt to bridge the widening cultural and ideological chasm between the ruling classes and the common folk, the anti-Westerners exalted the anarchic community relations and equalitarian and humanist values of the Old-Slavonic world and of the Russian peasant commune. But they also emphasized the value of the Church-State unity, and sought a Messianic redemption of the whole world through the absorption of the State by the Orthodox Church and reestablishment of a paternalistic system of community relations ruled by collective conscience and based on Christian love and compassion.

In the meantime, that is, by the second part of the nineteenth century, with the growing impoverishment of the rural gentry and with increasing educational opportunities for all strata of the population, the ranks of the educated classes (*intelligentsia*) were being swollen by many declassed people as well as by increasing numbers of young people from the families of clergymen, of lower government employees, of petty tradesmen and other lower classes (*raznochintsy*). Even though Czardom at the time was still governmentalized to a high degree, it was not totally regimented. Moreover, by the second part of the nineteenth century, under the pressure of the West, and in order to match the military, the educational, the industrial and the social levels of the Western world, Czardom abolished serfdom and made other concessions in the direction of a libertarian and a juridical state. This trend of events reinforced the penetration of Western political and social philosophies which tended

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[XIX century]

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to undermine the existing Church, State and family system based on self-abnegation and on unconditional submission.

As a result,[1] a number of raznochintsy intelligentsia, freed of fear and awe before God, the Czar and the Father, but feeling thwarted in their political ambitions and socially rejected, expressed their dissatisfaction and their hostility toward the existing conditions of inequality and oppression by developing ideologies of denial and destruction. Their aim was to reject and to annihilate all the basic institutions and authorities on which Czardom rested: the family, religion, property, the power of the Father, the authority of the Church, as well as the rule of the Czar. These revolutionaries denied God and conscience as well as any existing ethics or rules of conventional conduct. They sought to destroy Czardom "root and branch" and to seize power for themselves by all and any means. Their professed objective was to establish on the earth an all-human stateless society of totally free men living in a system of equalitarian justice and fraternal love.

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Thus, while seeking to reestablish the anarchic and group-oriented values of the early Slav folk and of the Russian peasant commune, these revolutionaries exhibited also Messianic power-centered urges and destructive drives common in the ruling classes of Czardom. Hence a number of these people became professional conspirators, advocating establishment of an underground organization with rigidly centralized total power commanding expendability of its members, and demanding their complete dedication to the cause of the revolution. They considered this system of organization to be the only effective way to fight the Czarist rule. In this "mortal struggle," these dedicated young men and women tolerated no opposition or differences of opinion, propagated extreme hatred and pitilessness in dealing with all adversaries, organized assassinations, mutinies, strikes and mass risings, thus preparing the ground for the ascendancy of Bolshevism.

The Bolsheviks were a group of professional conspirators. In common with Messianic and power-oriented aims of all raznochintsy, the Bolsheviks endeavored to seize absolute and total power exclusively for themselves, by any and all means, as a way

1 [i.e. of undermining due to penetration of western influences -- Analyst]

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These feuds did not affect only the relations between local lords; intense strifes and vendettas were flourishing within the family of each one of the princes. Struggle for power and expansion often caused fratricidal warfare among the brothers after the death of their father. The old chronicles and other historical documents are full of examples of such family feuds. Murder, torture and blinding among the brothers and even between fathers and sons apparently were frequent.[20] The life of each one of these local potentates was spent in perpetual warfare, in feuding, and in plundering adventures.[21]

Power-thirstiness, factionalism, and rule of crude force prevailed among these petty rulers in no lesser way than among their nomadic predecessors and overlords. The internal system of rule on the domains of each prince was not more advanced. As the Russian written laws of that period testify, the killing of prince's representatives on the part of the peasants must have been frequent. City populace often rose in riots and revolutionary outbursts against the oppressive conditions imposed by these lords.[22] It was such conditions of physical, social and emotional insecurity that favored perpetuation of the institutions, practices, and other behavior traits which were introduced by the nomadic invaders and conquerors.

III

The changes that in the course of several centuries were taking place in social and psychological structure of the Old-Slavonic world as a result of the imposition of the rule of the nomadic warriors seem to have been well reflected in the Great-Russian folklore, especially in its epic legends. The military, the peasants, the burghers, their conflicts and their character traits are personified in these narratives by a number of popular heroes.[23]

The general picture which these folk documents present shows that the social stability which existed in the Old-Slavonic society was completely shattered as a result of nomadic invasions and conquests. The invading warriors not only caused great havoc but they provoked rapid and fundamental changes in the structure of the old society. Moreover the social disorganization and the political and economic instability that resulted out of these

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events were apparently manifested in a widespread sense of emotional and physical insecurity which fostered destructive aggression and mass violence. In such circumstances extreme self-seeking and dominance-submission relationships tended to substitute the Old-Slavonic egalitarian and anarchic system.

The plight of the Slavonic peasant strata has been symbolized in these products of folk imagination in the person of Mikula Selyaninovich ("the Villager's son") and in that of Ilya of Murom, who is often referred to as "the peasant's son," and as "the old Cossak." Mikula is pictured as a superb plowman and fie[illegible] la[illegible]orer. He has a keen knowledge of husbandry and possess[illegible] the best mares and the best farming equipment.[34] He is endowed with such tremendous strength and is entrusted with such heavy responsibility that he carries "the weight of the whole world" in a little shoulder bag. This villager, however, comes into conflict with the city people over the custom duties and over the haughty manner of the urbanites. The tolls imposed by the city are too high. Moreover, the burghers treat Mikula in a despicable and undignified way. So he is enraged and loses his self-control:

> I was in the city no longer ago than the day before yesterday,
> On my light bay mare,
> I carried thence two whole bags of salt,
> Two bags of salt of forty pud each.
> The folk there are no better than robbers.
> They demand two kopecks toll;
> But I had a leaded whip for toll
> I paid their two kopecks toll.
> Whoever was upright I left seated
> And whoever was seated I left prostrate,
> And whoever lay prostrate would never rise again.[35]

As a result of such conflicts, Mikula finally came to the conclusion that tilling was not profitable any more. He found that there were other and better ways which would guarantee to one safety, economic gain, and self-respect. So he gave up husbandry and joined Volga Buslavlevich, the bandit-warrior. In his new role in which he uses great physical power not as a productive force, but as a means of coercion, he makes a strong imprint on

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the mind of the burghers. As a result, the city folk changed their attitude and instead of haughty bearing they now "bow low" to Mikula.

Ilya of Murom, the other hero of peasant origin, is portrayed as "being crippled" for many years. Then suddenly he acquires gigantic strength from two sources: from psalm singers and from Svyatogor, a hero of supernatural origin and superhuman powers. By means of this acquired strength and by employing cunning, Ilya gets rid of Svyatogor and, like Mikula, joins the bandit-warriors. However, the professional warriors do not accept Ilya on equal terms because of his low origin. But by constant demonstration of superior physical strength employed as a means of intimidation Ilya is finally accepted by the ruling military aristocracy. After a terrifying demonstration of physical strength which shook the whole town to its foundation Prince Vladimir became so panicky that he hurried a messenger to humbly invite Ilya to a prince's feast:

> Knock upon the door five times
> Then cross yourself in the prescribed manner
> Make your bow as it is enjoined,
> Offer humble salutations, and beat with your forehead
> Upon the floor of bricks,
> Upon damp mother earth herself,
> Before the old Cossack, Ilya of Murom.[26]

It seems clear that in these two heroes of peasant origin we find reflected the vicissitudes to which the Old-Slavonic society has been exposed after it has been subjugated to warriors and traders. The moral and productive values of the peasants, symbolized by Mikula's strength, his skill in productiveness, his social responsibility and feelings of dignity and equality, were rapidly declining in the changing conditions. The peasants became an easy prey of the new ruling classes. The result was moral corruption on the part of the soil cultivators, disinterest in land, and an urge to revolt. The peasantry became "crippled." First they expected help from supernatural forces. Then finally they began to rely on guile and on terror to protect themselves. They realized that in the new political atmosphere it was superior physical force which was admired and respected. Many peasants

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therefore were leaving the land to move to the cities or to join the bandits as traders and warriors.

These bandit-warriors are pictured in the Russian folk epic as ruling by such terrifying violence and dreadful terror and craft that all the living beings on the earth flee and hide, or lie prostrate, and even the earth itself shrinks and the sun sinks away at their appearance:

> The red sun was sinking
> Behind the dark woods, behind the broad sea,
> Multitudes of stars studded the clear sky
> When Lord Volga Buslavlevich was born
> In holy Russia.
> When Volga Buslavlevich was five years of age,[27]
> Lord Volga Buslavlevich went forth over the damp earth
> Damp mother earth was rent,
> The wild beasts fled away up to the clouds;
> And the fish scattered in the blue sea:
> And Lord Volga Buslavlevich went
> To learn all craft and wisdom,
> All the various languages;[28]
>
> Volga grew in strength and stature.
> He chose for himself a bold druzhina,
> Of thirty youths save one,
> He, Volga making the thirtieth.
> His dear 'uncle' bestowed upon him,
> Gracious Vladimir of Royal Kiev,
> Three cities with their peasants.[29]

The hero knights of these legendary *Byliny* (the events of the olden days) when they find themselves in circumstances which appear to be under their control, are likely to be boastful, quarrelsome, disrespectful, sensitive to rank and inclined to belittle the strength of their adversaries. In such circumstances they spend their time either in plundering, fighting, maiming and killing, or in feasting, debauchery, and drunkenness.[30]

The extreme power-compulsion and delusions of grandeur of these supermen, as well as their complete lack of self-control, are well symbolized in folk narratives about Svyatogor. This hero has an irresistible urge to bring the heaven and the earth to-

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Tver the ancient,
Tver the wealthy,
And the two brothers,
The two bold Borisovichi.
At once young Schelkun
Stabbed his son,
Filled a bowl of his blood,
His warm blood,
And drank up the bowl of that warm blood:
And straightway Tsar Azvych
Bestowed upon him
Tver the ancient,
Tver the wealthy,
And the two brothers,
The two bold Borisovichi.[32]

However, as soon as such "Good bold youths who have robbed and slain" find themselves in circumstances which appear to be unsurmountable, they are inclined to become cowardly, are overwhelmed with gloom and fear, and tend to rely on crouching servility and on guile and cunning as a means of self-preservation. When in such a mood they picture their enemies as superhuman, beastly beings possessing supernatural strength, thus justifying the lack of fair play in dealing with them.

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It is possible that this radical change of social structure was projected into the new folk concept of the supernatural world. The Old-Slavonic fairyland inhabited predominantly by benevolent spirits was apparently transformed under the new conditions into a demonland full of beings with terrifying and macabre qualities. Blood-sucking vampires, heart-devouring witches, fiends that feast on human flesh, and other murderous and rapacious beings similar to those found in the underworld of the steppe nomads replaced the Old-Slavonic helpful deities and moderately malignant spirits.

In the same manner the Old-Slavonic benevolent wizards apparently evolved into rapacious and slaughterous witches who specialize in child eating. The Old-Slavonic beautiful and benevolent water spirits developed into monsters who bewitch people, especially the youths, and then draw them down into the deep waters to put them to death. The Old-Slavonic friendly and

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attractive forest fairies who used to help travelers changed into beastly demons who trick wayfarers into making them lose their way and then cause them to perish.

The imposition of the rule of nomadic warriors over the soil cultivators brought about not only insecurity of life and property, but disintegration of the old ways of life and of the old morals. Social disintegration favored detachment from the group, caused decline in group identification and solidarity, tended to increase self-concern, fostered destructive aggressiveness and anti-social behavior. Hence, drunkenness, debauchery, orgiastic practices, together with robbing and killing, became prominent. According to Fedotov, the old Christian sermons are so full of invectives against such behavior that some studies of Russia's religious life consider that these themes formed the main content of anti-pagan literature of those days.[33]

Perhaps as a result of such social disorganization the Old-Slavonic Goddess of Love (Lada) was relegated into the background and obscurity. Instead, male gods of bacchanalian passion and Dionysiac orgy (Iarilo, Pereplut) became outstanding in folk imagination.[34] A phallic rite was observed at wedding banquets and sexual promiscuity during the feast gathering of young people became prominent, according to the old sermons.[35]

It was under these conditions of social disorganization and insecurity, and ascendency of power-oriented patriarchal system over the old stateless, semi-matriarchal and equalitarian order that the attitudes toward women changed radically. Mounting hostilities generated by conditions of strife and insecurity can be vented not only through inordinate sex life, alcoholism and delinquency, but also by aggressive behavior against all the unprotected and the weak. And just as sex life tended to take the form of lechery, and love that of uncontrolled passion, the attitudes toward the women changed from respect and reserve to that of scorn and contempt. They came to be looked upon as impure and unclean physically and morally.[36]

It is possible that the new unsatisfactory social conditions might have also affected the concept of the Christian God and attitude toward death. Not only did popular imagination in conditions of disorganization and insecurity tend to see in this

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God a wrathful, irate and revengeful Old Man, but the Church leaders themselves, affected by the conditions of their society, were inclined to emphasize the fear aspect of the Christian God rather than his love and compassion. They also tended to preoccupy themselves with death, describing it as a terror-striking event. In some early Church sermons even the messengers of God, the angels, were represented in a terrifying manner:

> Then, two angels appear, sent by God for the soul. As soon as the soul has seen them, it will be horrified; all its image and beauty and face will change; feet and hands will be torpid, and the hearing as with the tongue will be chained by silence; and man will be all sorrowful and invalid and woeful; and afterwards, appears death. And then, with a terrible pain the soul will issue from the body . . .[37]

These feelings of anxieties and fears, combined perhaps with a strong sense of guilt of the Church leaders, are manifested in the life histories of most Russian saints. These people, as portrayed in their hagiographies, were being constantly threatened by temptations and intimidations of dreadful demons. Hallucinations about demons became very frequent among the monks, and struggle against demons became one of the main aspects of ascetic life. Whole herds of these fiends were sometimes seen by the ascetics. The demons would disguise themselves as humans, as angels, and even as Christ, or they would appear in their true beastly form.[38]

Consistent with this gloomy and terrifying view of life and death was also an apocalyptic picture of the end of the world as pictured by Church leaders. According to the old Russian sermons the end of the world was very near and it was to ensue in fire and floods of blood brought about by a wrathful and revengeful God, (a picture that strongly reminds one of the vision of the end of the world found in the beliefs of the steppe nomads of Central Asia):

> Then undying fire will flow from the East to the West, devouring mountains, stones, trees, and the sea. The firmament will be dried up and turned like brick bats, and all existing things, except men, will melt in a like way by the rate of the fire. All the earth will be burned; and through this undying fire all mankind has to pass.

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There will be no place to run and hide oneself; it will be woe and pain without comfort, particularly for the repenting sinners. They will see the anger of God, full of rage and wrath, bearing the woe of revenge.[1]

Also the folk religious poetry began to emphasize the gloomy aspects of *post-mortem* life, especially that of the *Strashny Sud*— The Terrible Judgment. It was perhaps in such conditions that Destiny, together with the Truth, became dissociated from the idea of a supreme Justice that reigned everywhere and came to be looked upon as being subject to the caprice of arbitrary and uncontrollable forces that now dominated the Universe.

Such circumstances might have meant quick disintegration of this society, not unlike the rapid dissolution of the Turco-Mongol empires, had it not been for agents that favored the stabilization and the perpetuation of this social system in spite of its internal weaknesses. One of the most important instruments in this process of social consolidation was the Byzantine Church.

5
THE BYZANTINE CHURCH AND MUSCOVITE MILITARY THEOCRACY

I

FOLLOWING the traditions established by the Roman Caesars, the Emperor of Byzantium (Basileus) was looked upon as the supreme war-lord, the sole legislator, and the chief justice, as well as the universal ruler. Therefore, the Church, which was subjected to the absolute and autocratic will of the Emperor, developed a religious ideology in accordance with the dominant political philosophy and practices of the Empire.

The Emperor assumed the duty of defending the Church, combating heresy, and spreading Orthodox faith throughout all the globe. In return, God had promised him universal dominion

1 [cf. ref. 116, pp. 52-55.--Analyst]

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565 423 701 dependency of the land recipients upon the Czar, because the Czar could at any time withdraw the grant.

642 565 423 By means of the pomestie system of land tenure which prevailed in the second part of the sixteenth century the Muscovite rulers obtained both of their objectives: unlimited power and permanent war preparedness. Once the owners of the estates became dependent upon the Czar for the possession of their lands, any opposition on their part could be crushed easily, especially if the caste solidarity and the development of an *esprit de corps* among these people could be prevented. By the end of the seventeenth century the hereditary land tenure and the conditional land tenure were equalized. As a result all nobility became service nobility (*dvorianstro*), dependent upon the Czar for their lands. All therefore became *holopy*, the slaves of the supreme *gosudar* (master). Neither type of land holder could alienate his land either by sale, exchange, or any other process. The principle was that "He who owned land should serve the Czar."

178 642 565 Thus, by the end of the seventeenth century, by making the nobility economically dependent and having the support of the Church, the Muscovite Czars were enabled to eliminate all potential opposition to their rule and to perpetuate their despotic power. After the nobility was subdued and regimented, the other classes, including the clergy, followed suit. By the end of the seventeenth century the slaves and free land tenants were equalized and bound to the land and burghers were bound to their [486] *posads*. It was prohibited for any person to move from one town or borough to another without special permit. There could be a penalty of death for such flight or desertion.

By this time, therefore, all persons were bound to their status. A rigid caste system was established for the purpose of securing for the Czar permanent and controllable bodies of people whose function was either to pay cess or to render military and state service. The whole state was regimented and militarized for the [641] purpose of the Czar's aggrandizement, defense of the realm and military campaigns; each person had one duty only—to serve the Czar and the country. The whole society was geared to increase the revenues and the military might of the Czardom.

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They used to go starke naked, save a clout about their middle, with their haire hanging long and wildely about their shoulders, and many of them with an iron coller in chaine about their neckes or middles, even in the very extremity of winter. . . . Among others at this time they have one at Mosco that walketh naked about the streets, and inveyeth commonly against the state and government. . . . Another there was, that dyed not many years agoe . . . that would take upon him to reproove the olde emperour, for all his cruelties and oppressions done towards his people. His body they have translated of late into a sumptuous church neere the emperours house in Mosco, and have canonized him for a saint. Many miracles he doth there. . .[15]

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Another form of protest or of reaction against the existing conditions consisted of mass vagrancy. Many thousands of these restless people were roaming the roads, the forests, and the deserts, as beggars, as pilgrims or as agricultural nomads. Many of them spent whole lives wandering, unable to find peace and rest.

IV

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Conditions in which abusive dominance-submission relationships, self-concern, lack of trust, and destructive aggression thrive do not favor unification and stability of an empire. Yet the Czardom showed a steady and remarkable development in spite of such unfavorable circumstances. In the course of several centuries it had grown from a small principality into a great world power. Just as in the states of steppe nomads, the social agents which were responsible for self-seeking, power-orientation and internal restlessness and explosiveness encouraged also external expansion. But unlike the empires of the steppes, there were [182] in the Empire of the Czars several circumstances which fostered ideological and moral unity, such as the politico-religious philosophy of the Orthodox Church and conditioning on the family and community-level. It was perhaps this combination of the explosive and unifying tendencies which was responsible for steady expansiveness and growing consolidation of the Czardom.

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From its very inception the Russian state was a military soci-

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6
WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND RUSSIA'S BUREAUCRATIC AUTOCRACY

I

THE STRUCTURE of Muscovite power had some advantages in comparison with the Turco-Mongol system of rule. The steppe warriors had not developed an efficient system of administration. They depended upon their vassals for the collection of taxes. This practice gave an opportunity to the vassals to enrich themselves, which strengthened their feelings of independence and of revolt. In the same manner the principle of religious tolerance and the practice of granting Church autonomies helped to perpetuate religious, linguistic and cultural differences among the subjects, a situation that did not favor ideological unification and centralization of power. In Russia, on the other hand, a system of centralized administration which followed the Byzantine pattern took care of revenues and of military manpower. The enserfed agricultural population was a source of steady income. Furthermore, state dominated Church tended to Slavicize linguistically and to unify ideologically all subjects under the Czar.

However, this system of Muscovite military theocracy that was efficient in dealings with the Mongols, proved inadequate in Russia's relations with its adversaries in the West. Since the end of the middle ages Western countries went through a series of ideological and economic changes which had fundamentally affected the structure of the Western world. Humanism and Renaissance, Reformation and Counter-reformation, the industrial and political revolutions had brought about considerable intellectual and technological advance and radical structural changes. Compared to the West, Russia had many drawbacks in her economic system. Its power-centered and militarized social struc-

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ture was detrimental to the development of trade and industry. For centuries its economy remained founded on a system of primitive agriculture. Lack of large centers of trade and industry adversely affected rural economy. There was no stimulation for agricultural improvements and for freeing of the serfs. Instead, the emphasis was on the exploitation of serf labor as the most expedient means to satisfy the demands of the landlords and of the state. The landlords were mostly absent on military campaigns or other state duties and were generally disinterested in land improvements. At the same time the system of using the land as a pay for military or other state services, in a country whose war campaigns and military contingents were increasing, tended to diminish the size of the donations and increase the burdens imposed on the serfs.

The lack of urbanization, together with the low standard of education of the service nobility, kept also the intellectual development of Russia far behind that in the West. Intellectual activity was limited mainly to the court circles. The ideology and practices of the Russian Church favored intellectual stagnation. Russia accepted Christianity from Byzantium after the Greek Church had already given up classical traditions of Hellenism. By the time Byzantine Christianity entered Russia, Byzantine literature had assumed an almost exclusively ecclesiastical character, and education consisted almost entirely of religious teaching and the reading of the lives of the saints. Art, too, became exclusively religious and stereotyped. All thought was regimented according to religious dogmas and political objectives of the power-holders.

In Russia this type of intellectual rigidity and inactivity was emphasized because of the use of the Old-Slavonic language in the Church, which resulted in neglect of Greek language. And it was considered a sin to learn the "thrice accursed Latin tongue." Thus, the Russian clergymen became isolated from the West because they lacked the possession of the only instruments in which human knowledge was communicated in those days. Moreover, Russian Orthodoxy, like the Byzantine Orthodoxy, was based on monasticism. But unlike the manifold monastic practices of the Western Church, the monks in the Russian Church tended to lead an inactive life of asceticism aimed at personal salvation.

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where true Christianity was preserved. In the official statements, in the prayers, in the Church sermons and school textbooks, the Russian Empire was represented as a Holy Land (*Sviataya Rus*).

Accordingly, official geographic studies and statistics tended to magnify everything within the frontiers of the Empire. Russian possessions and might, the resources and riches of the Czar, the progress and virtues of the country were pictured in the school textbooks in a fabulous way. A steady and imposing territorial growth of the Czardom in the course of many centuries at the expense of the East and the West undoubtedly supported these feelings of greatness. In this manner successes in policies of external expansion promoted desires for further conquests.

As long as the authority of the Church remained unshaken the power of the Czar rested on solid foundations. The Czars were able to increasingly concentrate and monopolize all social power while the Czardom expanded territorially in all directions, in spite of all its internal weaknesses.

In the meantime, however, the economic, educational and religious reforms introduced since the eighteenth century tended to undermine the sacredness of the Church as well as the power of the Czar. It was in such circumstances that feelings of revolt bred on all levels of social organization had an opportunity to come into the open, challenging the Czarist regime and all the institutions on which it was based. The people who were treated like wards and minors and were kept in oppressive dependency in the family, in the local community and on the state level rebelled against the system which kept them in perpetual bondage, a trend of events which finally brought about the downfall of the Czardom. The family roots and the development of this personal and social revolt which had shattered the Czardom will be discussed on the following pages.

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women and children of the household. The power of the bolshak was lifelong, but in case of mismanagement, prolonged illness or want of mental powers, the family adult male members or the village elders could remove him and place another adult male as the head man of the household.[2] All the property: land, farm implements, cattle, buildings, household furniture, and utensils were considered common property of all household members, particularly male adults. But women's clothing and other personal belongings, such as linen and canvas, brought as a dowry or produced by women were considered their private property. When such a household was broken up the common property was divided equally among all the adult male members, regardless of the degree of blood relationship.

The bolshak was assisted in his management by a family council (*soviet*) consisting of married male members, while the bolshuka was assisted by the married females. Though the bolshak's place after his death was taken by his eldest son or his eldest brother, it happened occasionally also that such a household came to be ruled by a woman, if she proved to be an exceptionally resolute personality and good manager.

The remnants of such a family collective persisted in some rural parts of Russia until the beginning of the twentieth century. Such a household in which some of the Old-Slavonic traditions were still in existence was looked upon as a labor association, as much as an association of blood-related families. This is why the heads of such a family commune were designated, not by parental names, as father or mother of the family, but by functional names, as managers of the common property.[3]

Originally the powers of the household soviet were an important check on the authority of the head elder. The soviet assured protection against inequity and tended to maintain equalitarian relationships among the married members of the household. However, early in the development of the Great-Russian society the events tended to favor the power of the bolshak. Following the practices of Mongol rule, frequent censuses were held and frequent levies were imposed on the population according to the number of households or according to acreage. The village community which composed a cess district was made jointly respon-

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ties—the state, the Church, the landlords, and the village tax commune—joined hands in backing the collective household system and the power of its head elder.

II

In this manner, under the pressure of circumstances, the *bolshaya* system of jointly ruled community household was gradually giving way to the *otsovskaya* system, that is, the patriarchal family in which the power-oriented steppe traditions tended to take precedence over the Old-Slavonic egalitarianism. Patriarchal traits prevailed especially in the urban strata. The father became absolute master as well as the exclusive owner of the family property in the otsovskaya system. As a result of this change in household structure all family members became economically and personally dependent upon the father; and as long as his power was supported by the state and the Church, they were expected to submit unconditionally to his will; there was no appeal against his arbitrariness, favoritism, and even misbehavior.

As a result of such a development the steppe traditions of life and death power of the father over his wife and children, the relationship of absolute dominance and complete subordination tended to be reinforced and perpetuated. The Church was particularly instrumental in this matter. Under the influence of the Church the father was likened, in the popular mind, to the Almighty. "As God is to the people, so is a father to his children" (*Kak Bog do lyudey, tak otets do detey*),[5] the people would say.

The father had at his disposal a number of ways to impose his will. Owing to the Church teachings, one of the main paternal sanctions consisted of invoking God's wrath This was done by means of malediction or withdrawal of blessing. Parental curse, as well as lack of parental blessing, was certain to bring great misfortune to the disobedient child (*Lisheniem otsovskogo blagoslovenia shchitaetsa chelovekom propashchim.*)[6] The emphasis on need of parental blessing and fear of disastrous consequences of parental curse is stressed in many Great-Russian folk customs and in their folk sayings, folk songs, and folk tales.[7]

Another instrument at the disposal of the father in imposing

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lead the others. Russia was therefore predestined to fulfill this world mission. Hence the Pan-Slavs looked to Moscow, the ancient Russian capital, not the Westernized "City of Peter" (Petersburg) as the heart of Russia[17] and of mankind of the future—the Third Rome.

15
REVOLT OF THE RAZNOCHINTSY INTELLIGENTSIA (NIHILISM AND ANARCHISM)

I

BY THE second part of the nineteenth century, new changes were taking place in the economic relations as well as in the political and class structure of the Czardom. First of all, the process of disintegration of the old order under the impact of the industrialization and bureaucratization was rapidly coming to an end. Serfdom was abolished and with it there came the disastrous ruin of manorial estates which were not prepared to cope with the difficulties of a money and market economy. The result was that the number of impoverished and pauperized gentry was greatly increased.

At the same time the new laws tended to place emphasis on property. Thus, for instance, in the local assemblies of the noblemen the elective franchise was granted only to noblemen possessing a certain amount of land or a certain value of industrial establishment. This difference in civil rights according to the amount of property introduced a sharp cleavage into the gentry class. Earlier all dvorianstvo and all chinovnichestvo were considered equal in rights and had at least theoretically an equal chance to rise in power or to win the favor of the Czar. But now the new laws disfranchised and declassed a large part of the gentry. Similar laws favored the richer class among the merchants which meant that even in municipal affairs birth and education decreased in value in comparison with wealth.[1]

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In the new secularized and urbanized society also, the position of the clergy became increasingly precarious. Like other institutions of the Czardom the Russian Orthodox Church was organized along the lines of sharp social differentiation and dominance-submission relationships. Russian Orthodox clergy as a whole formed a closed caste institution. All lay clergymen and many monastics were recruited from among the members of the families of lay clergy. Endogamous marriage was practiced within this caste. The church maintained its own schools for both the sons and the daughters of clergymen. In this manner the clergy had been separated from the rest of the society and had developed a sub-culture of its own. The clerics were set apart from others not only by their priestly garb, but by their manners, and even by their names.

Internally, however, within the ranks of the Orthodox clergy there was a sharp distinction between the monastic order (black clergy) and the secular priesthood (white clergy). The monastic order was rich in land donations and other possessions and all the Church hierarchy was recruited from among its ranks. The secular clergy was not only subordinate to the monastics, but also poor. Among the secular clergy sharp class distinction existed between the city clergy and the village priests. This differentiation was manifested in the differences in income, education and prestige, as well as in the lack of intermarriage between these strata. The difference was also reflected in the attitudes of the laity. While the city clergy were socially accepted by the middle and lower urban layers, the village priests were rather isolated from the rest of the population.

However, the sharpest difference and social distance existed between the Church hierarchy and the rank-and-file clergymen. The heads of monasteries, for instance, behaved like real magnates. They took in large revenues, kept servants, horses and carriages, and hardly shared in the life of their monastic brothers, even though these Church dignitaries resided in monasteries. In the same way, the bishops were inclined to belittle the lay clergy under their control. They treated them with a great want of respect. They would abuse them, insult them and then even flog them.

[i.e. developing in the second half of the XIXth century — Analyst]

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Pensa gubernia rose against the landlords with the slogan "Liberty and Land" (*Zemlya i Volya*).[4] Ever since they had been enserfed and bound to the land, the peasants kept in cherished memory the *Yuriev den*, St. George's day, the day when in earlier times each peasant was allowed to leave his landlord (*vykhod*). The peasants' demand for freedom from bondage was as strong as their demand for land. When the ideas of personal, economic and political freedoms started to penetrate Russia from the European West, also, the Russian peasants, owing to a growing contact with the city and the intelligentsia, became affected by them and in consequence revolts were increasing in number. Between 1826 and 1830 there were 41 cases of peasant rebellions and between 1858–1860 there were 284 such uprisings.[5]

It is significant to note that these peasant rebellions became especially prominent and especially widely spread each time the ruling class had suffered loss of prestige, such as in case of defeat on the battlefield. During the Crimean War in 1854 and 1855 widespread peasant uprisings took place on the shores of the Volga, and in central and southwestern gubernias, the Vladimir, Ryasan, Tambov, Pensa, and Voronezh.[6] In these provinces the mir institution prevailed and periodical redistribution of land was practiced. Here also reaction against abusive and humiliating conditions of serfdom was very intense and demand for land became very strong. In these provinces the traditions of earlier revolts were fresh in the memory of the peasantry. In addition, growing density of population and increasing land shortage tended to strengthen the revolutionary attitudes of the peasants. Their hostilities turned against the landlords whom they blamed for all their ills and misfortunes.

II

The defeat in the Crimean War and the internal disturbances which followed that war forced the Czarist government to undertake measures to reorganize its armed forces and to stabilize the regime internally. After being defeated by technologically and politically superior enemies, the Czarist government finally realized that in order to improve Russia's fighting effectiveness vis-a-vis the West, higher state revenues were needed and these

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could be achieved only if Russia was to change radically its economic structure. As a result of such a trend of events and of thought the government passed a decree in 1861 according to which the peasants were set legally free from their masters.

As a consequence of his legal emancipation, the peasant found himself in the possession of less arable land than before, and he was still bound to it. He was overburdened even more than before because he was obliged to pay high redemption dues in addition to the heavy taxes that were imposed on him. Moreover the peasants in land communes not only remained jointly responsible to the government for the payment of taxes, but they were also made jointly responsible for redemption payments. The commune's authority over the peasants was increased and the peasant found himself under an even more exacting and more despotic commune regimentation than the one that existed before the "Emancipation Act."

At the same time the peasant still did not have sufficient arable land. He also lacked pasture grounds and timber which were of special importance in his technologically backward and extensive agricultural economy; most of such land was left in the hands of his former masters. The acuteness of land shortage was especially felt because of lack of artificial fertilizers, need for draught animals, and primitiveness of farm equipment. Many peasants did not even possess a wooden plow.

But though the emancipation act of 1861 still kept the peasants bound to the land, and did not provide them with sufficient land, it did open up opportunities for their economic advance and political activation. By the latter part of the nineteenth century, the peasantry became generally recognized as a potentially very significant force, both politically and economically. It was this prospect of the peasant masses as the leading political power of the future in combination with the Slavophil idealization of the peasantry that gave rise to the ideology of *narodnichestvo* (populism). This ideology idealized the virtues and the creative potentialities of the peasantry, and just as the Slavophils, the narodniki claimed that the reconstruction of Russian society, even of the whole world, will come from Russian peasantry.

By the end of that century a faction of Russian radical intel-

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565 The speeches of the peasants' deputies
423 in the second Duma unmistakably show that the peasants con-
[646] sidered that the land belonged to them and to nobody else and that the times of degrading oppression were over. They declared themselves in favor of the free distribution of all the land that was in the possession of the nobility, the Church, and the state:

> We are talking of land these days as of nothing else. We are told it is a sacred, inviolate possession. I think if the people want it, there can be no inviolateness about it. Gentlemen of the nobility! You think we have forgotten the time when you used us as stakes in playing at cards and exchanged us for dogs! We know we were your sacred inviolate property. But the land has been stolen from us. The peasants who have sent me here have said that the land is ours! We have come here not to buy but to take it.[14]

669 Because of such beliefs and ideas which were intensified by
565 systematic revolutionary propaganda of professional conspirators
425 and agitators, any rumors concerning the land always found a
627 ready response among the peasantry. It is for the same reason that often only a vague rumor about a government land decree was sufficient to convince the peasants that the land was given back to them by the Czar, but that it was the lesser government officials, bribed by the landlords, who kept the land out of their hands. Such land-hungry peasants, already inclined to rebel against age-long and humiliating dependency, were ready to take the law into their own hands, to seize the manorial lands, to loot the estates and to kill the landlords whenever they felt that the power of the existing authorities was crumbling.

178 The professional conspirators among the Russian revolution-
565 ary intelligentsia took full advantage of such inclinations. Their revolutionary plans were especially favored by the growing differentiation in the Russian villages. In the first decade of the twentieth century economic and social differentiation in the Great-Russian village was already well advanced. It was favored by a series of government measures (Stolypin reforms)[15] which were aimed at developing a stratum of independent and prosperous peasantry and destroying the system of communal landholding. As a result of such measures the Great-Russian village became by the first decade of this century composed of a number

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of strata, whose interests were often conflicting. There were the *obshchiniki* (the communal landholders), the *otrubniki* (the peasant private property owners), the *khutoriane* (isolated homestead owners), the *bednyaki* (the poor and indebted peasants), the *serednyaki* (the middle peasants), and the *kulaki*. Finally, there were still the pomeshchiki who owned manorial estates with arable lands, timber-forests and pasture grounds. These were, however, gradually selling their land to the better-off peasants.

The peasant private landholders prospered better than those in the communes. The yield per acre on communal lands has always been much lower than on the private lands. The communal landholders had to rely for a part of their income on wages. These they got as seasonal industrial workers or as agricultural laborers on the lands of the landed gentry. They also worked on the lands of better-off individual peasant property owners whom they resented and called *"novye pomeshchiki"* (the new squires). The poor, landless, and indebted peasants antagonized the better-off peasants. The lower and the middle peasants resented the kulaks and the pomeshchiki.

At the same time the individualization of the Great-Russian peasantry was proceeding very slowly in spite of government help and encouragement. By 1912 the proportion of consolidated peasant holdings, as compared to those remaining in the communal system, was less than 11 percent. Between 1907 and 1915 only about 20 percent of the peasants left land commune.[16] This slow decommunalization did not, however, indicate lack of desire for private land ownership. The reasons for the persistence of the old communal land system lay in the shortage of land, in peasant poverty, in vested interests within the village commune, and finally in traditional lack of self-reliance among the peasants.

As long as a large part of the Great-Russian peasantry remained in the system of communal landholding where lack of initiative and primitive techniques of cultivation prevailed, no great general improvement in land cultivation and in the standard of living of the peasantry could have been expected in spite of all government efforts. Thus, economically insecure and

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hungry for land, resentful of degrading dependency and inclined to be hostile to the existing authorities, many peasants were ready to follow the leadership of professional conspirators and demagogues who incited them to revolt and promised them "land and freedom." Such feelings and attitudes were of decisive importance in the revolutionary days of 1917, as well as later in the civil war.

20
ASCENDENCY OF BOLSHEVISM

I

WHEN the Czardom in the eighteenth century embarked on its policy of industrialization, the newly built industries, both those state owned and those owned by the landed nobility, were based on serf labor. Also the non-noble entrepreneurs purchased or rented serfs to work in their mines and factories.[1] In such conditions the technical equipment and the production output of Russia's industries remained at a very low level. There was no incentive to introduce technological improvements as long as the labor was abundant, and its cost low. Only a few industries, such as the cotton industry which was in the hands of non-noble owners, and which from its start was based on free labor, had introduced modern machinery. Thus since the Russian industries did not advance technologically and were unable to compete with the European industrial products, they had to be protected by high tariff barriers, by grants and subsidies. This situation kept the level of prices of manufactured goods high in comparison with the buying power of the industrial workers, of peasants and of middle urban strata. The resulting lack of buying power of these broad strata of the population made the progress of industrialization in Russia very slow, uneven, unstable, and chronically affected by crises

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and unemployment, a situation that was well exploited by the professional conspirators, particularly the Bolsheviks.

By the end of the nineteenth century the first wave of strikes swept the country.[4] At first the strikes were spontaneous, local and purely economic in character. The workers wanted higher wages and better working conditions. But since many industries were located in Petersburgh which was the center of heavy industry, and in Moscow which was the center of the railroad system and of the textile industry, the revolutionary intelligentsia and professional conspirators and agitators who were also concentrated in these two capitals could not fail to see great political opportunities, both in the concentration of the industrial proletariat, and in its economic plight. But there were differences among the revolutionary factions of the intelligentsia in regard to revolutionary propaganda and agitation.

The ideological differences as to propaganda policies and revolutionary strategy was one of the factors which led to the split of the Socialist Democratic Party into two factions, the *Bolsheviks* (the majority), and the *Mensheviks* (the minority). Being mostly of urban middle class origin the Mensheviks were inclined to advocate gradual advance of the country toward democratization. They also proposed an alliance with the liberal bourgeoisie. Accordingly also in internal Party organization the Mensheviks were in favor of a policy of liberalism and democracy. The Bolshevik faction, on the other hand, was recruited from among the raznochintsy who were affected by Anarchism and were inclined toward extremist solutions and recognized no compromise. They proposed an alliance with the revolutionary peasants and an armed rebellion staged by the workers and peasants as the most effective means of seizing power.

Following the ideas and practices of the Anarchists and the Terrorists (Narodovoltsy), the Bolsheviks claimed that the immediate seizure of power was of paramount importance while the work of educating the masses could begin later. That end, the seizure of power, to the Bolsheviks no less than to their political predecessors, the Anarchists, sanctified everything. Deliberate instigation of hatred, planned deceit, individual killing, armed uprising, and systematic terror were all equally approved

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is therefore said to be necessary as a means to completely eliminate "exploitation of man by man" and to bring about stateless and equalitarian society in the future.

In this manner any signs of opposition to the Party policies have been construed as "class struggle" and "counter-revolution" which made it possible for the self-seeking and mistrustful ruling faction of the Bolsheviks to eliminate all opposition to its rule, including the opposition within the Bolshevik Party itself. These means and justifications of self-perpetuation in power have been supported also by the contention that the counter-revolutionary schemes of the overthrown and dying classes are encouraged and fostered by foreign capitalist powers.

These imperialist states are said to tend to encircle the "only Socialist country" seeking to destroy it.[2] Contrary to the early Socialist promises that the state will tend to "wither away" after the proletariat had seized power, the Bolsheviks asserted that, after the proletarian revolution the state must become even more powerful because it must be used as a "special machine of suppresion."[3] Thus, instead of satisfying the traditional demands for acceptance in an all-human and stateless brotherhood, the Bolsheviks established relationships of absolute rule and unconditional obedience by monopolizing all social power in their hands. Each and every subject was made dependent for his life and livelihood upon the ruling faction. In this manner, planned economic regimentation, strict political conformity, control of thought and feeling, as well as police rule became intrinsic to the Soviet system of power.

In their compulsive drive to concentrate all power and all social control in their hands, the Bolsheviks dispossessed not only financial capitalists and large land owners, but even small farmers, fearing that these might eventually oppose and challenge their rule. "The medium peasantry is a self-sufficient class; the only one which, after the obliteration and expulsion of squires and capitalists, remains capable of opposing the proletariat," said Lenin.[4]

The need to regiment the peasantry, to break their group solidarity and make them completely dependent upon the government was supported also by other considerations. Owing to lack

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of foreign loans and investments the process of industrialization and of economic autarchy, which was needed to develop military potential necessary to withstand internal and external threats, was proceeding at too slow a pace. This situation made it imperative for the impatient and insecure ruling class to have at hand goods available for quick export in order to buy foreign machinery and to industrialize and militarize the country at a higher speed.

The peasants in the meantime were busy in making improvements on their possessions and in raising the amount of food for home consumption. Increased peasant consumption of food however meant decrease of the crops available both for export and for the needs of fast growing urban strata which were being created as a result of a speedy industrialization. Also lack of regulation of agricultural production meant that planting and sowing were designed to a large extent to satisfy the home needs of the peasant, and only to a lesser extent those of the national or foreign market.

This meant that as long as a large section of the peasantry remained as independent producers there was always a danger that the ruling class might not have at its disposal sufficient quantities of marketable products. And the more the ruling faction felt insecure in its power, the more this potential threat of an economically independent peasantry seemed real and close. This feeling of insecurity and mistrust of the Bolsheviks was manifested in their hatred of the peasantry. "The peasant who has two cows is already an enemy," they would say. Hence the Party hierarchy made the decision not only to abolish the economic independence of the peasants, but also to "destroy peasantry as a class" by means of collectivization.

In their determination to "destroy peasantry as a class," the Bolsheviks first incited the poor and the medium peasants against the "kulaks" and then the landless against the small peasant owners. The Bolshevik agitators took advantage also of the traditional tensions within peasant families and aroused son against father and brother against brother. Thus inciting and exploiting resentments and hostilities between various peasant strata and taking advantage of family antagonisms, the Bolsheviks were able

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to force the peasants to join the collectives and the state farms. Those who opposed such policies were resettled or banished to convict labor camps. Many were massacred. According to Stalin ten million peasants became victims of this "class war."[5]

In order to insure their complete control over the farming population, the Bolshevik leaders sent the most trusted Party people from the city to the village to manage the newly formed *kolhozes*. These *novye bary* (new lords), as the peasants called them, installed themselves in the mansions of former estate owners and kept themselves at a considerable distance from the rural population, not unlike the former serf-owners. And not unlike the former gentry the new masters were also bent upon extracting maximum labor from the peasantry with minimum reward.

Under such conditions, the peasants, in the first outbursts of their reaction against this state of abusive submission resorted to outward aggression in the form of traditional uprisings. They burnt their crops and slaughtered their cattle rather than collectivize them. It is estimated that almost two-thirds of the entire livestock and a large part of the crops were destroyed.[6] Such a situation affected even the Ukraine, the "granary of Russia" and greatly contributed to the famine of 1932–33 in which hundreds of thousands of people died of starvation and epidemics. It was by such active rebellion that the peasantry forced the Party into a temporary retreat. The Party had to appease the peasants by giving each peasant household the right to retain in private use a small plot of land, and also in private possession a limited number of livestock. Also, private trade in agricultural products was restored in a limited degree.[7]

These were however only temporary concessions, since the Bolsheviks were determined to completely "industrialize" the peasantry as a means of political and economic control. Following such aims the highest possible degree of specialization in farm operation has been fostered and the members of the same family have been assigned to different, spacially separated activities. In this manner the agricultural brigade instead of the peasant family became the basic unit of agricultural production. For the same reason the highest possible degree of mechanization of

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241 178 agriculture, centered in Motor Tractor Stations, has been fostered.[8]

474 465 463 At the same time differences in individual income levels have been encouraged by means of a differential wage system based on the degree of specialization, the amount of work, the quality of labor and the quality and quantity of production. There is also a tendency to train each kolhoz member for one specialty only. In this manner differentiation is increased, family self-sufficiency and family bonds are being destroyed, a greater degree of dependency upon the Party is achieved, group solidarity is weakened and the development of organized peasant opposition is prevented.

241 463 178 The "industrialization" of the peasantry seeks to eliminate the old type of peasant farmer who was self-sufficient, had manifold interests and possessed a variety of skills needed to manage his economy, of which he was the owner and the manager. By fostering specialization and wage differentiation the Party hopes to develop a type of agricultural worker and specialist who is skilled in one activity only, and cannot be self-sufficient. Since in this manner every agricultural worker becomes entirely dependent upon others, and upon the Party, it is expected that as a result of such conditioning the drive to own farm property will disappear, that all land property will then become governmentalized and that agricultural labor will become in all respects and for all purposes the same as industrial labor, that is, completely divided within, dependent economically, and better amenable to Party control.

474 178 It is along such lines of thought that the Party has recently endeavored to amalgamate kolhozes into large collective units. In small collectives the Party's control was weak or non-existent and the peasants were enabled to maintain a degree of group solidarity and to put up a certain resistance to government agrarian policies. According to the Party's admission "small collective farms blocked the progress of socialist farming."[9] Therefore, in order to "strengthen their directing personnel" the Party decided to amalgamate small farms into large ones. The management of these amalgamated collectives is to be put entirely in the hands of non-peasants.[10]

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This trend to expropriate the peasants and to overspecialize them as a means of political and economic control found its expression in the recent development of Bolshevik ideology. In the utterances of Party leaders and in the Soviet press it is being stressed that the conditions in the Soviet Union are already so advanced that the Soviet state is ready to move from socialism into the first levels of a limited Communism. This first phase of Communism will consist of the elimination of differences between industrial and agricultural work, between industrial workers and the peasantry ("Liquidating the contrast between the city and the village"). Thus it is pointed out, the old opposition between the country and the city will vanish and also cultural and psychological differences between these two strata will disappear. Every person will become engaged in a special "technical-engineering" task and all will be equal and like brothers.

As a result of such development, it is said that even the differences between the manual laborer and the intellectual worker will eventually be abolished and thus the classless and anarchic society envisaged in socialist writings and rooted in the traditions of the Slav culture will be finally achieved.[11] Productive forces will develop an abundance of all consumer goods whose distribution will be on the basis of exchange and according to one's needs. There will be no monetary relations and no differences in social status.

It is clearly and repeatedly emphasized, however, that nobody should mistake this change from socialism to communism as a "withering away" of the state. The state, say the Bolsheviks, must remain "strong" for the needs of defense,[12] until the Soviet system spreads over the entire earth.

II

Total power concentrated in the hands of Bolshevik conspirators as a means of perpetuation of their rule led to compulsory regimentation of all labor, to speed-up system, and to intensified differentiation in skill, income, and status within the working classes. The aim of these measures is to increase production and to control the working classes by breaking their group solidarity and by tying the laborer to his machine and the office worker to

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dissenters, in the civil wars as well as in the struggle between the Czarist police and the revolutionary intelligentsia; it was even formulated as an ideology and became a credo of Anarchism.

In the Bolshevik ideology this anti-humanism is justified by representing the "enemies" as not being human beings. Just as in the folk attitudes toward enemy aliens, the oppositionists and the adversaries, actual and potential, real and imaginary, are identified in Bolshevik writings with "gnats," "insects," "reptiles," "dogs," "wild beasts," and "beasts of prey." It is by such ways of reasoning that the Soviet pedagogists have come to the assertion that indoctrination of the people with "burning hatred" of the enemy does not contradict the ideas of humanism, because, they claim, the ideas of humanism and humane feelings do not apply to beasts. In this manner even acts of cruelty toward the "enemies" are condoned and encouraged:

> Hatred of the enemies of the socialist Motherland by no means contradicts the principles of humanism, since it is devoted to the protection of the rights and liberty of the worker from the designs of beasts of prey.[24]

The need for such an appeal to extreme animosities against the adversaries is in itself an indication of instability of the Bolshevik system. The ruling faction had to resort to such a means in order to promote complete identification with and fanatical devotion to the Cause and to the Leader. Here, however, we see a noticeable difference between the Czardom and the Soviet Russia. Though the Czarist system often exhibited aspects of extreme ruthlessness, the whole ideological and intellectual development of the Czarist Russia, especially in the last century of its existence, was in the direction of increasing Westernization and humanization. This trend coincided with certain gains in the field of personal, economic, and cultural freedoms in the Czardom.

As a result terrorism and acts of violence, though widely practiced, were not openly advocated as official Czarist policy. Many moderate and conservative factions of the intelligentsia strongly denounced all acts of terror performed either by the government or under the auspices of the revolutionary intelligentsia. One

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792 One of the outstanding tenets in the philosophy of Russian monas-
829 577 ticism whose history is even longer than that of the Czardom was
[795] charitable love. Many sects of the *Raskolniki* propagated and practiced principles of humaneness. The Slavophils were espe-
829 577 cially prominent in advocating the return to an idealized state-
less society of benevolent paternalism where brotherhood, Chris-
[177] tian love, and compassion would reign. The "Westerners" endeavored to introduce into Russia Western concepts of justice and tolerance, and a humanistic, libertarian and juridical state. Russian belles-lettres, Russian school textbooks, as well as laws and regulations in the nineteenth century and up to the beginning of World War I, bear witness to this trend toward Westernization and humanism.

178 661 In Soviet Russia, on the other hand, after a brief initial period of reaction against the old regime which led toward an emphasis on all-human values and equalitarian brotherhood, soon the trend of events pushed the Bolshevik ideology in the opposite direction. The determination of a ruling clique of professional conspirators to maintain themselves in power by any and all means dictated the emphasis on the internal and external "threats" which would justify the intensification of internal "measures of security," and of external aggression. Thus vigilantism and war preparedness, and expansion of internal and external Bolshevik power, became the main base of the policies of the ruling class.[25] Such policies had to be constantly reinforced by a deliberate incitement to hatred and destruction.

661 642 The image of Soviet society as being in a constant state of war, not only against foreign enemies but against internal oppositionists, deviationists, spies, saboteurs, and remnants of bourgeois mentality has been determined by a social structure which the Bolshevik rulers themselves have created, but which makes their own power uncertain and precarious. In such circumstances Lenin's idea of a life and death struggle with the "class enemies," the idea that "it's them or us" (*Kto kogo*) has provided the main motivating force of the Party's internal and foreign policies. Fearing to be annihilated unless they themselves destroy their enemies, conscious that they have "either to rule or to die," the Bolsheviks have ruthlessly applied the principle of "obedience

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and Eastern Siberia. In the Middle Volga Region live the Mordvinians and the Mari of the Finno-Ugric group and the Tatars and the Chuvash of the Turkic group; on the western slopes of the Urals are, from north to south, the Komi, the Komi-Permyak, and the Udmurt, all belonging to the Finno-Ugric group, and the Bashkirs, members of the Turkic group. On the northern slopes of the Greater Caucasus live a wide variety of peoples, including the Avars, the Darghins, the Lesghians in the east, and the Circassian tribes in the west. These national elements belong to the Caucasian linguistic group, of which Georgian is also a member. The Ossetians, who live in the central part of the Greater Caucasus, belong to the Iranian group. In Western Siberia, in the valleys of the Altay system, are other representatives of the Turkic group: the Altay tribes (a group of several small national elements), the Khakass, and the Tuvinians. In Eastern Siberia, the two principal nationalities are the Buryat-Mongols of the Mongolian group and the Yakuts of the Turkic group. A large number of small elements in the extreme north of the Russian SFSR belong to the Finno-Ugric, the Tungus-Manchu, and the Paleoasiatic linguistic groups.

Prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, industry within the present confines of the Russian SFSR was located in the Central Industrial Region between the Volga and the Oka, with specialization in the milling of cotton, silk, woolen, and linen textiles. The Petrograd (now Leningrad) industrial district was the chief area engaged in machine construction, while the metallurgical industry in the Urals was still on a small scale. During the Five-Year Plan period industrialization progressed rapidly throughout the republic, with particular emphasis on the Volga Region, the Urals, Western Siberia and the Far East. The Central Industrial Region largely developed heavy machinery construction, the manufacture of precision tools, and the production of chemicals, while maintaining its previous importance as a textile-milling region. The Leningrad industrial district continues to be a machine-construction center. However, in contrast to the prerevolutionary period, when raw materials were usually imported, it now uses local mineral resources, that is, copper, nickel, apatite, nephelite (an aluminum ore), from the Kola Peninsula; coal and petroleum, from the Pechora River basin; bauxite, lignite, and oil shale from the vicinity of Leningrad itself. Power is obtained from hydroelectric plants on the Volkhov and the Svir' rivers. An entirely new industrial region was created on the Volga. This river serves as one of the principal transportation routes of the Russian

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SFSR, linking the Moscow industrial district via the Oka River and its own upper course, the Ural industrial district on the Kama River, the lumbering region along the Vyatka, the grain-producing areas along the middle Volga, the Donets coal and metallurgical district, west of Stalingrad, and finally the rich fisheries of the northern Caspian Sea. Among the principal goods transported on the Volga are: downstream, machines, textiles, fertilizers, metal from the Urals, and lumber; upstream, petroleum and cotton from Transcaucasia and Central Asia, fish, salt, melons, pumpkins, and grain. By rail, coal and iron arrive at the Volga from the Donbas, and coal, iron, and nonferrous metals from the Urals and Siberia. Recently extensive petroleum fields ("Second Baku") and natural gas deposits have been developed along the Volga, furnishing the basis, in addition to the goods brought by rail and water, for the establishment of important machine construction, chemical, woodworking, and food industries.

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In recent years the Urals have been turned into one of the largest industrial and mining regions of the world. Huge metallurgical establishments have been built at Magnitogorsk, Nizhniy Tagil, and other cities. Other mills process copper, zinc, aluminum, magnesium, and nickel ores. Large chemical and paper mills have risen along the Kama River. Important rail centers, such as Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk, Molotov, and Ufa, have turned into top-ranking machine-construction centers. One of the longest high-voltage power lines of the USSR links the several power plants and industrial sites of the region.

The main industrial district of the Siberian realm is the Kuznetsk Basin. On the site of extensive coal mines, ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy and machine construction have developed to a very great extent. The iron and steel mills of the Kuzbas work on the basis of local coal supplies and iron ore, partly of local origin, partly from the Urals. The once all-important Ural-Kuznetsk *kombinat*, involving the exchange of coal and iron ore between the two industrial regions, is gradually losing its importance as local iron ore deposits are being further developed in the Kuznetsk Basin. The principal industrial sites are Stalinsk (steel milling and machine construction), Kemerovo (coal and chemicals), Novosibirsk (machine building), and Belovo (zinc metallurgy). Another industrial region has been created in the Far East, with the principal centers at Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, and Komsomol'sk. Shipbuilding, oil refining, and machine construction are the principal activities.